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Abstract 
Alexithymia is a personality trait characterized by difficulties in identifying and 
describing emotional feelings. Impairment in the cognitive processing of emotions 
experienced by individuals with alexithymia translates into a limited capacity to 
symbolize their emotions. However, despite being one of the core aspects of the 
construct of alexithymia, emotional elaboration has not been thoroughly investigated. 
While a few studies have reported quantitative features of alexithymic individuals’ 
discourse, the qualitative properties of alexithymics’ emotional discourse and the 
difference in symbolization between positive and negative emotions remain to be 
examined. This study aims to explore how individuals with high levels of alexithymia 
symbolize their subjective emotional experiences, through an investigation of specific 
features in their discourse pertaining to positive and negative emotions. The sample 
consisted of 9 individuals with high levels of alexithymia, screened with the TAS-20. 
The participants were interviewed about a typical experience of joy and sadness. Data 
were analyzed using an interpretative phenomenological analysis approach. Themes 
associated with sadness revealed that high-alexithymia individuals tend to avoid 
contact with sadness and to perceive sadness as a state imposed by external events. 
Themes associated with joy revealed that this emotion seems easier to share with 
peers. Moreover, joy appeared to be easier to express and symbolize for high-
alexithymia individuals than sadness. This comprehensive description of alexithymic 
individuals’ emotional discourse provides us with a better understanding of the 
symbolization of emotions according to their valence and allows us to better 
recognize the ways in which individuals with high levels of alexithymia express their 
emotions.  
 
Introduction 
The term alexithymia was introduced by Sifneos in 1972 to frame clinical cases of 
psychosomatic patients who experienced significant difficulty in using language to 
express emotions, a dearth of fantasy life, and a lack of symbolic dreaming (Sifneos, 
1994). Today, alexithymia is measured by the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) 
as a personality trait composed of three main characteristics: (i) a difficulty 
identifying and distinguishing between feelings and bodily sensations of emotional 
arousal, (ii) a difficulty describing one’s feelings to others and (iii) an externally-
oriented style of thinking with pragmatic contents (Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994). 
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These characteristics represent the manifestations of two main deficits. The first is an 
impairment in emotional awareness, which causes the emergence of the first two 
characteristics. The second deficit, termed “operative thinking” (pensée opératoire), is 
defined by a lack of fantasy associated to a concrete cognitive style, which leads to 
the manifestations of the third characteristic (Bagby, Taylor, Parker & Dickens, 
2005). Generally speaking, the characteristics comprised by the construct of 
alexithymia are considered to reflect a deficit in the cognitive processing of emotions 
(Sifneos, 1994) and therefore, in the symbolic representation of emotions (Lane et al., 
1996).  
 
Symbolization is the capacity to link emotions to various types of cognitive 
representations, to create links between these representations in order to form a 
complex schema, and to verbalize these links and the system they create. Thus, the 
construct of alexithymia is not characterized by an absence of somatic manifestations 
of emotions; rather, emotions are felt but are seldom verbalized (Zimmermann, 
Salamin & Reicherts, 2008). Depending on the degree of alexithymia, this type of 
psychosomatic disconnect can be compared to emotional agnosia (not knowing or not 
recognizing emotions) or anomia (lack of words for feelings) (Taylor, Bagby & 
Parker, 2016), two conditions in which the ability to adequately link non-verbal 
emotional symbols (e.g., emotions) with verbal organization (e.g., representations or 
associations of representations) is impaired (Sifneos, 1994). Nevertheless, emotional 
experiences must be symbolized in order to be integrated into psychic life (Lecours, 
Bouchard, St-Amand & Perry, 2000) and to foster an effective regulation of emotions.  
 
Since alexithymia is conceptualized as a deficit in the symbolization of emotion 
coterminous with felt emotions, it seems essential to examine the manner in which 
high-alexithymia individuals integrate experiences of emotions into their psychic 
lives. Discourse analysis is a powerful tool to evaluate three abilities related to the 
integration of emotions. Firstly, the approach allows us to analyze, through 
individuals’ discourse, available symbolization resources used to articulate verbally 
affective experiences (Lecours & Bouchard, 2011). Secondly, emotional discourse 
can be in and of itself an emotion regulation strategy; for example, by sharing a 
difficult emotional experience in order to elicit social support (Bagby & Taylor, 
1999a). Accordingly, this also allows us to analyze a variety of emotion regulation 
strategies. Lastly, discourse analysis allows us to examine the cognitive treatment of 
emotions (Luminet, Rimé, Bagby & Taylor, 2004) and subsequently, representational 
deficits, which compose one of the core features of alexithymia. Despite being a 
central characteristic of the alexithymic experience, the quality of emotional discourse 
in alexithymic individuals has not been thoroughly empirically evaluated (Lecours, 
Robert & Desruisseaux, 2009). Consequently, analyzing the emotional discourse of 
high alexithymia individuals appears to be a crucial step in order to better understand 
cognitive symbolization and emotion regulation deficits experienced by individuals 
with alexithymia. 
 
Emotional Discourse in Alexithymic Individuals 
The earliest descriptions of alexithymic discourse come from incomplete clinical 
observations. For example, Bagby and Taylor (1999a) described some patients 
capable of labelling their emotions, although they were incapable of either elaborating 
Language and Psychoanalysis, 2018, 7 (1), 62-83.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.7565/landp.v7i1.1583 
 
64 
on them or linking them to memories or fantasies. McDougall (1978) emphasized that 
alexithymic individuals tend to use language as an act as opposed to a symbolic 
means of communicating feelings. For instance, language would be used to elicit a 
reaction in others instead of expressing and sharing an emotional experience.  
 
From a more empirical point of view, the beginnings of alexithymic discourse 
analysis were mainly based on quantitative elements of verbal content. In written 
essays, Páez, Velasco, and González (1999) found negative correlations between high 
alexithymic scores and levels of introspection, the frequency of self-references, and 
the ratio of positive words used in describing positive emotions. Roedema and Simons 
(1999) also found that high alexithymic subjects used less affective words to describe 
their state than their control counterparts. Also, a study by Luminet et al. (2004) 
measuring the proportion of emotional words used by alexithymic individuals, 
suggested that the deficit in the use of emotional words would be present only in 
emotionally charged contexts. Thus, it would not be considered a deficit in accessing 
emotional vocabulary. Although these studies generally demonstrated a negative 
relationship between the frequency of emotional references and the degree of 
alexithymia, their relevance is only partial as they fail to address the level of cognitive 
organization of affects associated with the personality construct (Lecours et al., 2009). 
However, a more recent study attempted to address the level of cognitive organization 
of affect by analyzing the semantic conceptual level of emotion representation, 
through the number of recurrence of certain language patterns and knowledge related 
to emotion in individuals with high levels of alexithymia (Wotschack & Klann-
Delius, 2013). The study’s findings revealed the presence of a reduced differentiation 
and elaboration of emotion schemata in high-alexithymia individuals compared to 
low-alexithymia individuals, including a significantly lower use of words to 
conceptualize emotions (emotion words), fewer physiological-expressive terms, fewer 
synonyms, and a heightened level of hesitation and of null responses. The study 
concluded that alexithymia moderates language use by demonstrating that semantic 
differentiation of emotion is reduced in individuals with high levels of alexithymia. 
While the study by Wotschack and Klann-Delius (2013) addressed the conceptual 
level of emotional representation in high-alexithymic individuals, it has not examined 
their ability to put emotions into words, and the subjective aspect of the speech of 
high-alexithymia individuals. 
 
More recently, some studies have taken an interest in the formal aspects of the 
discourse of alexithymic individuals in order to better understand notions related to 
the mentalization of affect (Lecours et al., 2009).  
 
A first instrument, the Verbal Elaboration of Affect Scale (GÉVA) (Lecours et al., 
2009), measures the mentalization of affect by evaluating the levels of tolerance and 
abstraction of verbalized affects. The use of the measure with individuals with high 
levels alexithymia also revealed that high-alexithymia discourse, when compared to 
low-alexithymia participants’ discourse, is characterized by a diminished level of 
verbal elaboration of affects (Lecours et al., 2009). Furthermore, the spontaneous 
verbalization of affect and the use of references to emotions have also been 
demonstrated to be reduced within this population (Lecours et al., 2009). 
 
A second instrument measuring formal aspects of discourse is the Level of Emotional 
Awareness Scale (LEAS) (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker & Zeitlin, 1990). Based 
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on a piagetian framework, it assesses four hierarchical levels of emotional 
representation, and distinguishes between the two lower levels termed implicit and the 
two higher levels termed explicit. The higher the level achieved, the more elaborate 
the emotional awareness of the individual tested. Based directly on verbal expression, 
the lowest score is attributed to individuals who describe thoughts instead of 
emotions. The implicit levels are characterized by the descriptions of physical 
sensations, the use of general and undifferentiated emotional words (e.g., I would feel 
bad) or the descriptions of actions. The first explicit level includes individuals capable 
of differentiating typical emotions, and the second explicit level represents individuals 
capable of integrating various emotions to describe a nuanced psychological state. 
Hence, the discourse of individuals with low emotional awareness would be 
characterized by the use of vague emotional words, and descriptions of concrete 
actions and bodily sensations. A study found that the TAS-20 subscale “externally-
oriented thinking style” is significantly, negatively correlated to the LEAS (Waller & 
Scheidt, 2004), suggesting that only the cognitive component of alexithymia is related 
to lower levels of emotional awareness. Important conceptual and psychometric 
differences appear to exist between the concepts of alexithymia and emotional 
awareness, as shown by the overall lack of correlation between the total score of the 
TAS-20 and the LEAS (Subic-Wrana, Bruder, Thomas, Lane & Köhle, 2005; Waller 
& Scheidt, 2004). It thus seems that the two concepts are partially overlapping, but 
measuring different aspects of emotional functioning (Taylor et al., 2016).  
 
Finally, the Affect Consciousness Instrument (ACI) (Monsen, Eilertsen, Melgård & 
Ødegård, 1996) measures the degree of consciousness and tolerance of affect, as well 
as the conceptual and non-verbal expression of emotions (Monsen et al., 1996). The 
dimension of conceptual expression of emotions evaluates the capacity to use clear, 
differentiated and nuanced language to describe a specific emotional experience. 
Hence, a low score of emotional consciousness refers to an individual who 
demonstrates difficulty in verbally describing and distinguishing emotions. This 
instrument’s total score has been found to be significantly, negatively correlated with 
the “externally-oriented thinking style” and the total score of the TAS-20, but not 
significantly correlated with the LEAS (Waller & Scheidt, 2004). This suggests, once 
again, a partial overlap with the alexithymia concept (Lecours et al., 2009) and the 
measurement of a different aspect of emotional functioning (Waller & Scheidt, 2004). 
 
While these findings provide a better understanding of the emotional organization 
underlying alexithymia, the instruments discussed above are only obliquely related to 
alexithymia. Although aspects of mentalization, emotional awareness and affect 
consciousness characterize a portion of the verbal behaviour associated with 
alexithymia, a large part of the alexithymic discourse remains unexamined. 
 
Symbolization of Positive and Negative Emotions 
Studies that have assessed alexithymic discourse quantitatively or formally have 
typically done so without differentiating between types of emotions, despite reports 
by clinicians mentioning a possible distinction in emotional symbolization based on 
specific emotions (Lecours, 2007). Indeed, some studies have reported that positive 
affects seem easier to mentalize than negative ones (Lecours & Bouchard, 2011; 
Lecours et al., 2000). Differences appear to exist even within the class of negative 
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emotions. For instance, deficits in symbolization of sadness have been considered 
more problematic as they are associated with more clinical symptoms and with 
borderline and narcissistic personality disorder traits (Bouizegarene & Lecours, 2017; 
Lecours & Bouchard, 2011).  
 
With regards to alexithymia, the TAS-20 score has been found to be negatively 
correlated with positive emotions and positively correlated with negative affects in a 
number of studies with different samples (Lundh, Johnsson, Sundqvist & Olsson, 
2002; Taylor & Bagby, 2013; Taylor, Bagby, Kushner, Benoit & Atkinson, 2014). 
These findings are not surprising considering the strong association between 
alexithymia and anhedonia, as described by Krystal (1981). They suggest that 
alexithymia is not characterized by a homogeneous deficit, affecting all types of 
emotions in the same manner.  
 
Despite these results, only a few studies (Luminet et al., 2004; Páez et al., 1999; 
Wagner & Lee, 2008; Wotschack & Klann-Delius, 2013) have measured positive and 
negative emotions separately within the discourse of individuals with high levels of 
alexithymia. One of these studies (Páez et al., 1999), found a significant negative 
association between the number of words used for positive emotions and the TAS-20 
difficulty describing emotion subscale, but no significant association was found 
between the subscale and the proportion of negative emotion words. Another study, 
by Wagner and Lee (2008), which measured the verbal expression of positive and 
negative emotions separately for a positive and a negative event, found a significant 
negative correlation between the verbal expression of emotion and the TAS-20 total 
score, only if the emotion’s valence was congruent with the event’s emotion valence. 
These findings highlight the need to further investigate the differences in the 
symbolization of emotions based on the valence (positive or negative) of experienced 
emotions.  
 
Objectives and Research Questions 
Taking into account the aforementioned theoretical and empirical contributions, the 
present study’s objective is to provide a more elaborate portrait of the qualitative 
aspects of the discourse of high-alexithymia individuals, in an effort to gain further 
insight into these individuals’ subjective experiences of feelings. To meet this goal, an 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), grounded in a constructivist 
paradigm, will be conducted. The exploratory nature of the research requires an 
inductive approach specific to qualitative methods. Furthermore, the principle of co-
construction, underlying the constructivist paradigm, is an essential contribution to 
research on subjective experiences. Since high-alexithymia individuals tend to have a 
marked difficulty expressing their feelings, the dynamic between the researcher and 
the participant is fundamental because it can help the participant stay focused on, and 
verbalize his or her introspective experience of emotion. The researcher’s 
participation in the construction of the participant’s experience is also critical in 
facilitating inferences for understanding the symbolization process, which the 
participant may not be able to express alone.  
 
The analysis of discourse will rely on experiences of joy and of sadness considering 
that the symbolization processes might differ with regards to positive or negative 
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emotions. The comparison of positive and negative affect verbalizations will allow a 
better understanding of how deficits in the symbolization of emotion vary in relation 
to positive and negative emotions. Since symbolization deficits appear to be more 
strongly associated with negative emotions, an analysis of discourse on sadness will 
allow us to better recognize the deficits in the structure of emotional elaboration. 
Hence, the present study seeks to address the following research questions: 
 
- How do high-alexithymia individuals describe emotional experiences of joy 
and sadness? 
- What are the themes and formal characteristics of a typical emotional 
discourse in high-alexithymia individuals? 
 
The second question has important clinical implications since the identification of 
typical characteristics the verbal productions of high-alexithymia individuals will 
facilitate the identification of these patients within clinical settings, and subsequently, 
will allow clinicians to tailor psychosocial interventions according to their specific 
needs.  
 
Method 
Participants 
The study was based on interviews conducted with 9 participants who each provided 
narratives on sad and joyful experiences. Data saturation for the present IPA analysis 
has been reached using this sample. According to Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009), 
the discourse analysis of 4 to 10 participants is most appropriate since it prioritizes the 
qualitative aspect of each individual experience. Therefore, this recommendation was 
followed. The participants were undergraduate psychology students, recruited from 
Université de Montréal. The sample was comprised of 6 women and 3 men, aged 
between 19 and 27 (mean age = 23 years).  
 
Alexithymia was measured with the TAS-20 and only participants with a score higher 
than 60 (thus attaining the threshold for the presence of a high level of alexithymia) 
were analyzed. TAS-20 scores ranged between 61 and 73 (mean = 64.2) in the present 
sample. This sample was extracted from a larger pool of participants who took part in 
a larger study. Although not a part of this qualitative study, some participants who 
were included in the larger study had very low alexithymia scores (below 30 on the 
TAS-20) and were also interviewed in order to obtain a description of a relational 
event involving the experience of sadness and joy. In order to contextualize the 
present findings, transcripts derived from interviews with three individuals with low 
levels of alexithymia will be used for comparison purposes when discussing the 
results. The three low-alexithymia individuals were all women, aged between 20 and 
23 years, and their TAS-20 scores ranged between 24 and 29. 
  
Instruments 
The 20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20). The TAS-20 is the most 
commonly used instrument for measuring alexithymia (Taylor et al., 2016). This self-
report questionnaire has demonstrated adequate validity and reliability, as 
demonstrated by a Cronbach alpha of .81, a test-retest reliability within 3-week 
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intervals of r = .77, an adequate pattern of correlations between factors, and an 
adequate convergent validity (Bagby & Taylor, 1999b). A French translated version 
with similar psychometric properties (Loas, Otmani, Verrier, Fremaux & Marchand, 
1996) was provided to participants in the present study. The total score of the TAS-20 
is based on three subscales. The first, called the “difficulty identifying feelings” scale, 
is used to assess the level of affect representations (e.g., “I am often confused about 
what emotions I am feeling”). The second, referred to as the “difficulty describing 
feelings” scale, is used to assess the capacity to find words in order to communicate 
one’s emotional experiences to others (e.g., “It is difficult for me to find the right 
words for my feelings”). The last subscale, termed the “externally-oriented thinking” 
scale, is used to measure individuals’ tendency to focus their attention and 
consequently, their level of interest outside of their internal emotional life (e.g., “I 
prefer to analyze problems rather than just describe them” reversed). In this study, the 
total score was used to assess the overall level of alexithymia. Participants considered 
to have high levels of alexithymia had a global score equal to or higher than 61, in 
accordance with predefined cut-off scores (Bagby & Taylor, 1999b).  
 
Procedure 
In the context of a larger study, participants first had to complete online 
questionnaires for about 75 minutes (which included the TAS-20). They were then 
contacted by email for an interview, for which they received a compensation of $15. 
Interviews began with participants being asked to recall a relational event involving a 
typical experience of sadness and then a typical experience of joy, narratives which 
were used in the present study. This was followed by an experimental emotional 
induction task which involved viewing only a sad excerpt from a movie. The study 
ended with a post-induction interview. All interviews were recorded and were later 
transcribed. The interview segment used in this study, from the initial phase of the 
larger study, started with the following statement: “I would like you to give me an 
example of a specific relational exchange that made you feel sad, a typical example 
that illustrates well your usual experience of sadness”. The interviewer then used 
reformulation strategies and reflections to further explore and specify the participants’ 
word choices. A similar statement was used for the joyful event, which was read as 
follows “I would like you to give me an example of a specific relational exchange that 
made you feel joyful, a typical example that illustrates well your usual experience of 
joy”. 
 
Analysis 
An interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) approach was used to analyze the 
data. This type of analysis focuses on the individual experience of each participant. It 
allows a better understanding of how participants make sense of their experiences.  
Grounded in a constructivist paradigm, this analysis takes into account a process in 
which the interpretations of both the researcher and the participant are involved. This 
analysis follows 6 specific steps. The first step consists of reading the transcript of 
one participant several times to allow the researcher to become thoroughly familiar 
with the content of the original data. For the second step, notes on the semantic 
content, the language used, and the voiced concepts are added to the verbatim. During 
the third step, emergent themes are developed. The fourth step consists of seeking 
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overlapping themes within the added notes. The fifth step is a repetition of the first 
four steps for each of the remaining participants. Finally, the last step involves the 
examination of patterns emerging within participants’ expressed themes (Smith et al., 
2009).  
 
Results 
Data from the interviews revealed six themes associated with sadness and three 
themes associated with joy. The themes reflected how sadness and joy are 
phenomenologically experienced but they also permitted to draw inferences about the 
relative levels of symbolization of emotions. All themes were present in the majority 
of the participants’ discourses. The themes associated with sadness were (1) avoiding 
contact with sadness, (2) pragmatic sharing, (3) lack of engagement in a resolution 
process, (4) emotions as the result of external events, (5) confusion with anger and (6) 
perceived difficulty in identifying and expressing emotions. For joy, although a 
smaller number of themes emerged, they still suggested a distinct form of 
symbolization linked to this positive emotion, probably associated with alexithymia. 
These themes were (1) achievement of goals, (2) expression through action and (3) 
joy experienced as a shared emotion. 
 
Sadness  
1. Avoiding contact with sadness. Participants described sadness as an affect that 
they wished to avoid rather than as a subjective inner phenomenon specific to certain 
relational events. When asked to elaborate on their way of experiencing sadness, 
participants had a tendency to describe strategies used to minimize their experience of 
sadness, as well as contact with or awareness of it. Among strategies to decrease 
contact with sadness, participants talked about evacuation and suppression. First and 
foremost, participants who seemed to use a suppression strategy talked about 
“burying”, “repressing” or “eliminating” sadness. For participants, this attempt to 
minimize contact with sadness seemed necessary in order to regulate and handle 
events surrounding the affect, as if the affect was considered too dangerous or painful 
to be integrated into psychic life.  
 
P4: I repress it, I think about other things. […] but, if it’s not that, I’ll either… um, 
either, um… It’s either self-mutilate, or… to let it pass. […] I repress it, I listen to 
music. So that’s it, I disconnect myself a little to let it pass. 
 
P1: I was telling myself that this girl, I’ll see her again in two of my courses plus 
the sport that I am training in, so I needed to keep in mind that that I still wanted to 
keep some kind of good relationship with her, so to eliminate as much as possible 
my negative feelings.  
 
Several suppression strategies were used by participants. Some also expressed a need 
to concentrate on other tasks or activities. This need to be “focused” or to “think” 
about other things denotes a tendency to decrease awareness of the emotion. Others 
simply talked about eliminating the affect rather than ignoring it. 
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Another strategy mentioned by participants aimed at reducing contact with sadness is 
evacuation. The affect was described as something that needed to be “evacuated” or 
“taken out” of themselves. As for suppression, this means of rejecting affect seemed 
to be a method for participants to regulate negative affects when they emerged. This 
strategy seemed to be used by participants who did not know how to experience 
sadness otherwise. 
 
P9: I don’t have a phase where I lie flat in my bed moping for a week. […] Well, 
you know, of course, of course I’m sad inside myself but… That’s how I evacuate 
it. Of course, that’s sad but um… you know, I don’t know I don’t care! (laughs). 
I’m sorry, but for me, that’s how I manage. 
 
2. Pragmatic sharing. This second theme was linked to the first since it also 
demonstrated that participants indirectly avoided engaging in behaviours that may 
lead them to come in contact with their feelings. Indeed, even if seven participants out 
of nine chose to share what happened with someone, they exclusively shared events or 
facts. They did not mention their experienced affects or their inner states, which 
enabled them to decrease their contact with it. This finding evokes the operative 
thinking aspect of alexithymia. Indeed, the content that was shared had a concrete 
rather than a subjective tone, suggesting that an inner mental space to symbolize 
emotion was lacking. 
 
P3: I expressed [the fact of being sad for leaving everything behind] by explaining 
why I had to go. Why I had to rebuild my life and all.  
 
P8: I didn’t say to my friend that I was feeling sad, I don’t say how I feel but I tend 
to talk about the events. 
 
3. Lack of engagement in a resolution process. The third theme that emerged was 
also strongly linked to the first, as it emphasized some sort of avoidance of sadness, 
whether it be a defense mechanism or the result of a feeling of helplessness when 
confronted with the emotion. Indeed, when participants tried to explain how the 
relational event that generated sadness ended, they did not engage in a process aiming 
to resolve the situation. Results show two strategies used by the participants when a 
resolution of the sad situation was explored: they either let time pass by without 
acting, or they severed the relationship linked to the affect by detaching completely 
from others, or through self-isolation.  
 
On one hand, the tendency to rely on time or to ignore what had happened denoted a 
certain level of passivity in addressing the emotional situation. The participants’ 
discourse showed that emotions were experienced as imposed on them and that they 
didn’t feel that they could act upon it. 
 
P7: I would say that it’s just time you know. Just let my frustration pass, and um, 
because actually nothing could have eased my frustration, it’s just really time. To 
say to myself, too bad, it’s done, move on. 
 
P5: How it ended, there’s not much to do, so I accepted it and that’s it. 
 
P1: I just understood that I needed to move on to something else. 
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In these excerpts, participants addressed the necessity (i.e. “need”) they had to stop 
thinking about the event and to leave it behind them, suggesting that affects were 
avoided and could hardly be accepted and integrated. 
 
On the other hand, some participants tried to avoid their affects by decreasing or 
breaking all ties to the individuals that were part of the relational event responsible for 
the sadness. Even if these participants undertook an action, this strategy was also 
experienced as an imposed necessity. Furthermore, the strategy didn’t allow 
individuals to engage in a resolution process that would support an adequate 
regulation of the experienced affect. 
 
P7:  I isolated myself, I would always take long walks […]. It seemed that I had to 
be alone because it was as if others had betrayed me. 
 
P8: I cut-off all contact, I said okay, I have to move forward. […] well, too bad and 
I have to forget about this.  
 
Avoiding to engage in a resolution process seemed to denote that sadness was 
perceived by participants as a state on which they could not act. It also meant 
avoiding contact with the emotion. 
 
4. Emotions as the result of external events. The fourth theme added to the third, for 
it also showed that affects were perceived as a state that cannot be acted on, as 
imposed by events, as if the participants had been spectators watching them unfold. 
Indeed, participants described a series of events concretely and concluded that these 
events had saddened them. Affects were thus perceived as having an external cause 
triggered by oneself or others and these events “inflicted” sadness upon them. Affects 
and the subjective aspects pertaining to the events were not addressed, suggesting a 
lack of integration of the emotion into the participants’ experience. 
 
P8: What made me feel the most sadness is when I talked to my best friend again 
[who doesn’t live in the same country anymore]. 
 
P3: […] in the end, it’s sad to quit, to quit everything to make sacrifices. […] It’s 
the unknown that makes me sad to quit everything. 
 
P4: But he doesn’t accept it, and that is what makes me sad. 
 
5. Confusion with anger. Although a defining feature of alexithymia is a difficulty in 
labelling feelings, participants in this study identified a wide variety of feelings 
associated with sadness. Among them, anger was expressed by most participants to 
various degrees (“discontent”, “frustrated”, “angry”, “enraged”). 
 
P4: It’s pretty mixed when it happens to me, I’m not too sure between sadness and 
anger. Both are alternating. It mostly comes after a state of anger that doesn’t last 
long, it gives way to sadness rapidly. 
 
As stated by this participant, the two affects were almost interchangeable for the 
participants, despite being qualitatively different. Sadness is normally a response to a 
loss whereas anger is generally considered a response to an event perceived as an 
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obstacle or aggression. Nevertheless, participants seemed to experience these two 
affects concurrently and were unable to adequately distinguish them, exhibiting a lack 
of differentiation. 
 
6. Perceived difficulty in identifying and expressing their feelings. In addition to 
perceiving sadness as an affect associated with anger, participants perceived 
themselves as experiencing only a few emotions, or as having difficulty being in 
touch with their feelings. They also expressed a difficulty expressing feelings, despite 
the fact that they labelled several different feelings when describing relational events. 
This theme was explicitly referred to by participants, and could also be inferred by the 
difficulty that some participants demonstrated in recalling a typical event associated 
with sadness.  
 
P6: It’s not something that I live a lot, so I don’t have a specific example in mind. 
 
P9: I don’t know how to describe it, I’m not that close to my emotions. 
 
P7: I experienced… I don’t know if it’s sadness! I think it is something else. 
 
The lack of contact with their feelings that the participants reported might have led to 
difficulties with symbolization since by feeling disconnected from their affects, and 
by subsequently not approaching them directly, participants seemed to have difficulty 
translating their emotional experiences into words. 
 
Joy 
1. Achievement of goals. For eight of the nine participants, the joy-related event that 
was recalled was associated with accomplishing a goal, such as obtaining a 
scholarship or a license, a victory, or the success of an endeavor that seemed 
impossible. Therefore, the experience of joy was principally associated with success-
related events. 
 
P9: When I received the letter [of acceptance], I was crazy you know, I was crazy! 
 
Joy was perceived as a reaction to an external event without reference to an internal 
subjective state. 
 
2. Expression through action. When participants were asked to describe an 
experience of joy, they described a series of actions rather than an internal state.  
 
P6: How I experienced it, well I took her in my arms, I was smiling… 
 
P9: I was jumping to the ceiling, I went to spend, like my God my entire paycheck 
you know. 
 
P8: We were in a cafe, we were screaming, we were standing, we were singing and 
clapping our hands. […] We had a big smile that we could not take off our face. 
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The description of actions could have denoted a lack of symbolization when joy was 
described solely in terms of behaviour without attention to an internal subjective 
realm. 
 
3. Joy experienced as a shared emotion. Finally, joy was reported by all participants 
as experienced with others, who were also experiencing a moment of joy. One of the 
key components of the participants’ discourse was sharing the affect with others. 
Knowing that the affect was shared and also lived by others seemed to accentuate the 
subjective experience of joy. 
 
P1: First, you know, a night out with friends, just like that, it’s a happy thing but… 
More than that, the event it, it brought something more, that’s it, it created a, like 
that exactly, like an euphoria, uh, everyone, from what I thought, had a lot of fun 
 
P6: You know, everyone was super happy for her really, it was like, uh, really 
super fun to see everyone happy […]. I think that her joy was, um, her joy and her 
expression of her joy was contagious too. 
 
Discussion 
Individual Differences 
The results of this study provide a snapshot of the emotional discourse of high-
alexithymia individuals associated with sadness and joy. Furthermore, this study 
allows for a better understanding of the level of symbolization of emotions exhibited 
by high-alexithymia individuals. In contrast to the initial description made by Sifneos 
(1994), student participants with high alexithymic scores on the TAS-20 do not show 
an extreme deficit in the variety of their emotional representations. Even if 
participants manifested important inter-individual differences, the majority of 
participants were capable of naming a number of feelings and of explaining a related, 
emotionally-laden event. Despite the use of vague emotional words (e.g., “I felt bad”), 
these individuals were capable of differentiating between typical emotions, for 
example sadness, guilt and anger. However, it has to be noted that they were asked to 
discuss a specific emotional interpersonal event (saddening or joyful). As shown in 
previous studies, high alexithymic individuals do report some negative feelings in the 
form of complaints of anxiety and depression, and may also talk about nervousness, 
agitation, restlessness, irritability, and tension, without nonetheless being able to 
elaborate on these feelings (Sifneos, 1967). The participants of this study however, 
demonstrated a higher than anticipated degree of emotional awareness (Lane et al., 
1996) and availability of emotional representations, as demonstrated by some 
elaboration and a more differentiated vocabulary than expected. For example, in order 
to describe a sadness-related relational event, participants used words such as 
depressed, overwhelmed, incomprehension, or surprise as the source of distress, 
reported feeling betrayed or not supported by others, loneliness, disappointment, guilt, 
and feeling torn. Moreover, they also referred to behavioural expressions, physical 
sensations, and overall references to emotional schemas, for instance situational 
references (e.g., “it wasn’t sadness as when someone dies” (P5)). Some important 
individual differences among significantly alexithymic participants in terms of their 
experience of positive and negative emotions are accurately illustrated by these two 
participants: 
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P4 (sadness): How I live it, it gets stuck in the chest, well in the thorax and the 
throat. So it keeps it all stuck in the throat. […] 
 
P4 (joy): (pauses) Well, I must admit (laughs) that nothing really happens like, it’s, 
it’s, it’s pretty much neutral for real during that time. […] So, what happens is I’ll 
do like others do around me, I’ll be a little bit like a monkey, I’ll imitate the 
gestures I see around, and then we’ll raise our arms and we’ll hug. 
 
Although this participant demonstrated a typical alexithymic difficulty in 
distinguishing between subjective emotional feelings and the bodily sensations that 
accompany states of emotional arousal, and in mentalizing emotions, some other 
alexithymic participants were capable of a much more elaborate symbolization of 
emotion, even with similarly high, or even higher, alexithymic scores (P4 = 62, P6 = 
73). Indeed, in the two contrasted excerpts, the participant that received the highest 
score on the TAS-20 has a discourse less typical of high levels of alexithymia:  
 
P6 (sadness): [talking about the loss of her family cat] yeah I was sad because, uh, 
it was, it was still a presence […] it occurred with another event in my life where I 
was hospitalized […] it changed like all the family dynamics […]. Um, it was a 
little bit like a separation, it’s not, you know, it wasn’t dramatic like you know 
what I mean, it wasn’t the end of the world but at the same time, um, well, I was, 
yeah, I was sad that he was gone yeah. […] 
 
P6 (joy): It was a happy event, like this girl, she had so many hard times the past 
10 years and then it was like if recently everything fell into place for her, like um, 
this joy that she’s experiencing, well it’s like it made me realize that you know, me 
too I’ve had hard times in the last few years and it says that it’s not because you’ve 
been through difficult things that you’ll stay there you know. 
 
This participant was able to attribute some meaning to her experience, in part by 
associating the event with other significant elements from her past (Lecours et al., 
2009). Therefore, the difference between these two participants on symbolizing 
capacities properly illustrates a more diverse and complex picture of alexithymia than 
the one suggested by the TAS-20’s set of items (Bagby & Taylor, 1999b). A possible 
explanation for this difference might reside in the nature of the test itself, a self-report 
measure. Indeed, during the interview, participants demonstrated an ability to 
perceive themselves as presenting a difficulty in being in touch with their own affects. 
However, what constitutes a difficulty can vary largely among individuals based on 
subjective standards, such as expectations of what being in tune with one’s feelings 
would normally look, and feel like. Perception of self is a crucial determinant of self-
report measures, and the variety of subjective standards could explain why different 
levels of symbolization were noted, despite all participants being considered to have 
high alexithymia scores according to the TAS-20.  
 
Sadness 
Beyond individual differences, the many experiential themes shared by the 
participants revealed a rather unified high-alexithymia picture when sadness is 
concerned. Even if alexithymia is conceptualized as probably involving both ability 
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deficits and avoidant defenses (Preece, Becerra, Allen Robinson & Dandy, 2017), the 
subjective narratives of sad events, as reported by high-alexithymia individuals seem 
to indicate a defensive pattern of avoiding negative emotions. Based on the 
participants’ interviews, the access, to some extent, to a feeling schema including 
behavioural and situational components, seems to indicate at least some cognitive 
abilities in the treatment of affect. From a more subjective perspective, the narratives 
indicate that sadness seemed to be experienced but avoided, leading to a truncated 
elaboration process (see Figure 1).    
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
Normal sequence of the emotional elaboration process. 
 
 
In the normal sequence of this elaboration continuum, the symbolizing capacities 
become more complex as the level of elaboration increases. The capacity for 
symbolization allows for increasing containment of the affect, which thus permits a 
more complex elaboration. However, high-alexithymia individuals report the 
subjective need to avoid sadness, which may restrict their tolerance of it, which may 
consequently constrict the elaboration process. Therefore, instead of depicting 
alexithymia as a deficit that prevents symbolization, the way high-alexithymia 
individuals experience sadness suggests that the first steps to symbolizing would be 
accessible but seldom attained as a result of their subjective need to avoid sadness, 
hence resulting in a defensive avoidant attitude. However, whether a defense or deficit 
played a role in the limited elaboration process could not be assessed by the present 
data. 
 
At the lowest level of elaboration, to “represent” refers to the capacity to characterize 
various angles or components of an emotion. Throughout their interviews, participants 
demonstrated an ability to label several standard feelings, in addition to an ability to 
verbalize somatic (e.g., P4: “it gets stuck in the chest, well in the thorax and throat”) 
and verbal representations (e.g., P3: “in the end, it’s sad to quit, to quit everything to 
make sacrifices”). This reflects the participants’ capacity for cognitive representation 
of the emotion schema. However, the confused perception of anger and sadness 
suggests an incomplete process of representation. Indeed, two qualitatively different 
emotions were intertwined, highlighting some difficulties in differentiating among 
representations of emotions. In an optimal process of elaboration, the presence of 
representations supports an ability to tolerate emotions. Yet for high-alexithymia 
participants, the defensive pattern associated with sadness indicates that this feeling is 
mostly avoided. Indeed, participants adopted a variety of defensive attitudes, 
suggesting a low level of tolerance. 
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First among these attitudes is the description of sadness as an emotion that should be 
suppressed or evacuated. The "evacuation” of sadness evokes conceptual formulations 
by Bion who proposed that unelaborated emotions (beta elements) have to be handled 
mentally by excessive projective identification, which amounts to the mental 
apparatus getting rid of the concretely painful experience (Bion, 1962). This 
conceptualization has been used to understand alexithymia by clinical theorists 
(Graham, 1988). Second is the tendency to avoid engaging in processes that include 
being in touch with an emotion, such as sharing the feeling with peers or initiating 
conflict resolution. Lastly, some typical defensive behaviours were also present, such 
as laughing during highly emotionally charged moments: 
 
P4: Yeah, and then when I talk about it afterwards, well, it makes me want to 
laugh, it’s nervous! 
 
P7: […] it’s that, I wish I could have helped her, but the only thing I was feeling 
was frustration. I don’t know if you ever lived with someone who’s anorexic, but 
it’s really um… you just to shake her and say eat damn it! (laughs) 
 
Therefore, the defensive attitude adopted by participants hinders tolerance, thus 
inhibiting the capacity to link representations together in order to symbolize them. 
Symbolic thinking refers to the emergent capacity to evoke a referent or an analogy, 
while associating it to representations, in order to verbally describe emotions, such as 
by likening emotional representations to a related situation (e.g., P6: “it was a little bit 
like a separation”; P7: “I needed to be alone because it was as if others had betrayed 
me”). As shown by the perceived difficulty in expressing and perceiving feelings, the 
symbolizing capacities demonstrated by the participants of this study seem to be weak 
and limited, due to their avoidance tendencies. 
 
Since symbolization facilitates appropriation, the latter is also constricted by the 
defensive attitude described in the subjective experiences of high-alexithymia 
participants. Subjective appropriation is conceptualized on a continuum, with at one 
end an unconscious or repressed representation of affect (not-me), and at the other 
end, the affect is experienced as one’s subjective and meaningful internal state 
(Lecours et al., 2009). However, for the participants in this study, sadness was often 
experienced as caused by external events, for example, as a consequence of another’s 
actions. Affect doesn’t seem to be fully appropriated by the participant (such as 
expressed with “I”, considered as “their own”), suggesting that emotions are 
perceived as imposed rather than as internal states. The results reveal a lack of 
subjective appropriation, thereby indicating a lack of underlying symbolization, 
considering that appropriation normally comes with high levels of mentalization 
(Lecours & Bouchard, 1997).  
 
Finally, appropriation in turn allows for meaningful connections, namely enriching 
the meaning of the emotional experience by linking it to previous life events or other 
elements of autobiographical memory (Lecours et al., 2009). During interviews, the 
underdevelopment of the elaboration process, and the subjective necessity to avoid 
sadness reported by the participants, suggest the presence of limited “meaning 
making” in their speech.  
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Descriptions of reactions from low-alexithymia individuals can allow for a better 
appreciation of the present results. Excerpts from interviews with low-alexithymia 
participants taken from the larger study are presented below for comparative 
purposes. The comparison highlights high-alexithymia individuals’ low level of 
appropriation. Low-alexithymia participants perceive the experienced affect as an 
internal state and the subjective appropriation is much more elaborated: 
 
PControl(C)1: […] then um, an example of sadness like that, my visits there don’t 
really happen as I would like and, I feel disappointed when I think, uh, of the 
quality time I spend with my parents and all that. So, it’s not as I expected and I 
would like it to be otherwise. […] I’m the kind of person who, um, expresses how I 
feel and, um, tries to find solutions so that it doesn’t happen again, but on the spot, 
I, uh well, I was a little bit like… hum, I don’t know like um… I just felt that… 
just really disheartened and I felt like doing nothing, I felt discouraged so when it 
happened it was like a huge down.  
 
PC2: I was sad because I was telling myself that maybe it is me who’s not capable 
of tolerating, like he’s new to the job and he tries his best and all and I was 
thinking maybe it’s me that is not capable of interacting well with him, so I was a 
little bit doubting myself. 
 
These participants are engaged in an introspective process that allows them to be in 
touch with the contained and appropriated affect in order to regulate it. Contrary to 
their high-alexithymia counterparts, the discourses of low-alexithymia participants 
shown above do not reveal signs of defensive attitudes nor deficits in cognitive 
treatment of emotion and, therefore, indicate that these individuals are capable of a 
more complex elaboration process. Like their counterparts, low-alexithymia 
participants demonstrate a capacity for representation through their ability to label 
several distinctive feelings. However, unlike high-alexithymia participants, they do 
not demonstrate a confusion with regards to their perception of sadness and anger. 
Moreover, the presence of improved representations reinforce their ability to tolerate 
affects, as shown by the tendency of participants to engage in the resolution of 
conflicts and to reflect on their sadness, rather than avoiding it. Lastly, appropriation 
of affect is also developed as opposed to the high-alexithymia participants. Indeed, 
feelings are described as fully one’s own subjective states (e.g., I was sad) as opposed 
to being the result of an external cause.   
 
Joy 
As an emotion, joy seemed to be easier to symbolize than sadness for the participants. 
All participants were able to easily share stories involving typical events associated 
with joy. Nonetheless, some aspects of their narratives suggest some kind of difficulty 
symbolizing. Although the elaboration of joy first appears quite usual and not 
marginally distorted by high-alexithymia participants, some observations denote a few 
similarities with the verbal treatment of sadness. 
 
While joy is experienced in situations of accomplishment, the participants do not 
articulate or symbolize their internal state of pride. Since the experience of joy does 
not appear to be mediated by pride, a difficulty in distinguishing between qualitatively 
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different feelings is suggested, as well as some deficit in representing affects. This 
characteristic evokes the difficulty in distinguishing between sadness and anger when 
describing the relational events associated with sadness. Next, situations of success 
are often the result of external events such as a victory in a sporting event, obtaining a 
scholarship or a successful test result. This hints at the emotional experience 
associated with sadness described by the participants, which are also understood as 
caused by events. As with sadness, such an externalization of causality suggests a 
limited appropriation of the subjective experience of joy. Finally, participants 
described their joy experience with behavioural terms instead of internal states, which 
also points to a low level of internalization or appropriation. This last characteristic, in 
addition to indicating a lack of subjectivation or mentalizing, is congruent with the 
pragmatic thinking associated with high levels of alexithymia. However, some 
research indicates that positive emotions might be naturally more easily expressed 
through behaviour (Mortillaro, 2018), which would mitigate the interpretation of joy 
being less mentalized when expressed with gestures. 
 
When the joy narrative of alexithymic participants is compared to their low-
alexithymia counterparts, the tendency to associate joy with external events becomes 
more clearly characteristic of high levels of alexithymia. During interviews, the 
discourse of low-alexithymia individuals is more pronouncedly directed towards 
interpersonal intimacy or general well-being, themes associated with less outward or 
behavioural manifestations of joy (e.g., screaming, dancing, hugging, etc.). Moreover, 
the low-alexithymia participants had a greater tendency to describe an internal state, 
rather than concrete actions, than high-alexithymia participants: 
 
PC3: Of course when I like like, I read a lot of novels and you know, I let myself 
go a lot, let’s say I get absorbed by the character’s emotion like, but that doesn’t 
count, that, that doesn’t work, no, I don’t know, just everyday joy let’s say I’m 
happy sometimes just when my mom cooks a good meal, I’m happy to come home 
and… […] And well you know I’m happy inside of me like.  
 
PC2: We were about to go to sleep and all and we were talking like in an intimate 
moment and he was like very, very sweet and very kind and you know I felt really 
good being with him, I felt we were close and all, and that made me really happy 
like I felt like, uh, good to be with him and, uh, happy that I had a beautiful 
relationship like that like privileged. […] like a feeling of well-being like I… I had 
the impression that like with him everything would be okay, you know, like a 
feeling that… like life is beautiful and you know like general and, uh, maybe, uh, 
uh, hmm, ease.  
 
To conclude, the differences between the elaboration of joy and sadness show that 
despite some similarities, the symbolization of positive and negative emotions is not 
equivalent. First, the lack symbolization of positive emotion is not associated with 
deficits in coping or emotion regulation. High-alexithymia participants do not report 
the subjective need to avoid feelings of joy, therefore it appears that participants do 
not adopt a defensive strategy with regards to this emotion. Rather, they tend to share 
and experience this feeling with others rather than to avoid it as they do with sadness. 
This also suggests a good level of tolerance of the emotion. However, symbolization, 
appropriation and signification levels are rarely reached in the elaboration process, as 
manifested in the high-alexithymia participants’ discourse. Despite this, since the low 
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level of elaboration is not associated with emotion regulation difficulties, the 
manifestations of high levels of alexithymia are somewhat less apparent. On the 
whole, positive and negative affects are not accessed in the same way by high-
alexithymia individuals. Nevertheless, our data suggest that the elaboration process is 
also incomplete for positive emotions. This result could partly be explained by some 
level of anhedonia, since alexithymia and trauma can be related, as described by 
Krystal (1981). Some studies have demonstrated that individuals with high levels of 
alexithymia frequently report histories of deficiencies in the caregivers’ response, 
which result in a reduced proneness to experience pleasurable emotions (Bagby, 
Taylor, Parker, 1993). The reduced inclination to experience pleasurable emotions 
might be explained by the lack of symbolization, appropriation and signification of 
joy. However, it has to be noted that the participants do not subjectively report a 
difficulty or a reduced proneness to experience joy. 
  
Limitations of the Present Study 
This study has some limitations. Firstly, the data treated in a phenomenological stance 
allows a rich description of the participants’ experience, but without fuller data on 
typical low-alexithymia verbal productions, it does not enable us to assert that this 
description is specific to high-alexithymia individuals. Secondly, the present sample 
was recruited in an undergraduate psychology program, which means that the 
participants might be representative of a group of more articulate high-alexithymia 
individuals, more characterized by defense than by deficit in the representation and 
verbalization of emotions. Moreover, their schemas, knowledge, and vocabulary of 
emotion might be more elaborate than the average population considering their 
studies. Also, although the TAS-20 is the most widely employed method for assessing 
alexithymia, a multi-method approach to the evaluation of alexithymia would have 
produced a more robust identification of participants presenting higher levels of 
alexithymia. For instance, the present findings indicate that highly alexithymic 
individuals vary as to their level of symbolization of emotions. The wide inter-
individual variations found in the highly alexithymic individuals in the present study 
might rest on the mono-method assessment of alexithymia used here. Relatedly, the 
interview format used in the study was not typical of qualitative studies as it was 
semi-structured and it asked participants to discuss feelings that are well-defined and 
delineated. This could have had the effect of favoring a more elaborate approach to 
emotions. Finally, this study offers a description of high levels of alexithymia 
manifestations without addressing the underlying construct. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present study aimed to provide a better understanding of how high-
alexithymia individuals describe their experiences of sadness and joy, as well as to 
describe the major themes found in the emotional discourse of high-alexithymia 
individuals. In light of how participants reported their subjective emotional 
experiences, sadness was experienced as an imposed state that needed to be avoided 
rather than as a subjective state. Joy was also experienced as the result of external 
events, but was not avoided. The study also suggests that the following verbal 
strategies could be used to reduce contact with negative affects: experiencing an affect 
as the consequence of an external event, the tendency to not share emotional content 
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with peers and to avoid resolving problems leading to emotional events. These 
strategies, used defensively, could hinder the capacity to contain and elaborate affects 
and therefore, its symbolization. These results suggest a difficulty with integrating 
affect into psychic life. Nevertheless, the high-alexithymia functioning that emerges 
from the present data is much more diversified than what is implied by the clinically 
based conceptualization of alexithymia. Participants demonstrate a variety of abilities 
for elaborating sadness. Participants also seem to present some difficulties 
symbolizing joy, although it appears to be to a lower extent than for the symbolization 
of sadness. Indeed, high-alexithymia participants discussing joy do not tend to address 
their internal states and frequently describe affects as the result of external events, 
suggesting a low level of appropriation. Despite this, positive affects are not avoided 
and are shared with others, suggesting that there is a difference in the elaboration 
process between positive and negative emotions. The non-defensive attitude toward 
joy seems to confirm that symbolization differs according to emotion valence 
(positive vs. negative) (Lundh et al., 2002, Luminet et al., 2004; Páez et al., 1999; 
Wagner & Lee, 2008). This study contributes to the understanding of alexithymia by 
suggesting that core deficits are found in the actual verbal expression and elaboration 
of emotions in highly alexithymic individuals, although theses deficits appear to be 
more important when dealing with negative emotions such as sadness. Our findings 
also suggest that various levels of alexithymia severity can be found in the emotional 
discourse of highly alexithymic individuals.  
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